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A30 Datasheet(PDF) 21 Page - NXP Semiconductors |
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A30 Datasheet(HTML) 21 Page - NXP Semiconductors |
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21 / 209 page ![]() NXP Semiconductors A30 Secure Authenticator A30 supports ISOInternalAuthenticate at the PICC level by default for originality checking with the Section 6.16.1.1 at KeyNo 0x01. The command can be disabled for privacy purposes through SetConfiguration Option 0x0E. At the application level, it depends on the key policy configured during key creation or update, whether the protocol is supported for a specific key. Certificates related to the unilateral authentication can either be stored in a certificate repository or in FileType.StandardData files. The parameter OptsA is optional. As it may be used for potential future extensions, the current implementation accepts and ignores it, including TLV-structures with a bigger length. If present, OptsA is included in the signature calculation to allow protection against future protocol downgrade attacks. Future implementations may then also return an OptsB with Tag 0x80. Upon reception of the command, the PICC generates an own 16-byte random number RndB and creates the signature as follows: Sig.B = ECDSASign(Priv.B, 0xF0F0[||OptsA]||RndB||RndA) For OptsA the full TLV-structure is included, while for RndA and RndB only the 16-byte random values are included. 6.3.3.4 Authentication overview The ECC-based card-unilateral authentication supported by A30 is based on the two-pass unilateral authentication as standardized in ISO/IEC 9798-3 [19] with the following modifications: • Identities are not communicated or included in the protocol: – the identity of the card may be extracted from the corresponding certificate. – there is no requirement for knowledge and confirmation of the reader identity by the card. Note that reader’s random sufficiently ensures uniqueness and timeliness, and therefore prevents the returned token to be accepted by other parties. • The references A and B are exchanged to be more aligned with other protocols in this document. An overview of this asymmetric card-unilateral authentication is given in Table 12. The inclusion of a random number generated by the card prevents the reader from having full control on the data that gets “signed” by the card. This is different from a generic ECDSA signature generation as supported with CryptoRequest. PCD PICC Knows:Pub.B The PCD generates a random challenge RndA Knows:Priv.B OptsA || RndA → The PICC generates a random RndB: The PICC computes its signature: Sig.B = ECDSASign(Priv.B,0xF0F0[||OptsA]||RndB||RndA) RndB || Sig.B ← The PCD validates the signature: ECDSAVerify(Pub.B, 0xF0F0[||OptsA]||RndB||RndA, Sig.B) Table 12. ECC-basedcard-unilateral authentication A30 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © 2025 NXP B.V. All rights reserved. Product data sheet Rev. 3.0 — 27 January 2025 Document feedback 976730 21 / 209 |
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