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A30 Datasheet(PDF) 32 Page - NXP Semiconductors |
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A30 Datasheet(HTML) 32 Page - NXP Semiconductors |
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32 / 209 page ![]() NXP Semiconductors A30 Secure Authenticator When using SDM, residual risks coming with the Secure Dynamic Messaging for Reading have to be taken into account. As SDM allows free reading of the secured message, i.e. without any up-front reader authentication, anybody can read out the message. This means that also a potential attacker is able to read out and store one ore multiple messages, and play them at a later point in time to the verifier. If this residual risk is not acceptable for the system’s use case, one of the authentication protocols (using challenge response protocol) and subsequent secure messaging should be applied. This would require using an own application and operating outside a standard NDEF read operation. Other risk mitigation may be applied for SDM to limit the residual risk, without completely removing it: • Track SDMReadCtr per tag at the verifying side. Reject SDMReadCtr values that have been seen before or that are played out-of-order. This is a minimum requirement that any verifier should implement. • Limit the time window of an attacker by requiring tags to be presented regularly (e.g. at least once a day) in combination with the previous mitigation. • Read out the SDM-protected file more than once. This does not protect against attackers that have read out the valid tag also multiple times and play the received responses in the same sequence. A30 supports two modes for integrity protection and authentication of the data: A30 supports two modes for integrity protection and authentication of the data: • symmetric SDMMAC, where the data is protected by a Message Authentication Code, which is generated by a symmetric AES key. This is specified in Section 6.3.8.8 and Section 6.3.8.9. • asymmetric SDMSIG, where the data is protected by a Signature, which is generated with the private key of an ECC key pair. This is specified in Section 6.3.8.10 and Section 6.3.8.11. This approach may ease the key management towards e.g. reader infrastructure as no secret key is required for the signature validation. Encryption is always based on symmetric cryptography, as specified in Section 6.3.8.4 for PICCData like the UID and Section 6.3.8.7 for generic file data (SDMENCFileData). The session key derivation for symmetric keys (be it for encryption or MACing) is outlined in Section 6.3.8.12. SDM is enabled and configured with ChangeFileSettings, see Section 6.10.2.3. Access right related aspects are defined in Section 6.10.2.1. 6.3.8.1 SDM Read Counter To allow replay detection by the party validating the data read, a read counter is associated with the file for which Secure Dynamic Messaging is enabled. SDMReadCtr is a 24-bit unsigned integer. The SDMReadCtr is reset to 0x000000 when enabling SDM with ChangeFileSettings. In cryptographic calculations and represented with binary encoding on the external interface, the SDMReadCtr is represented LSB first. When represented with ASCII encoding on the contactless interface, it is represented MSB first. This is in line with the NFC counter representation in [13]. In not Authenticated state, the SDMReadCtr is incremented by 1 before calculating the response of the first read command, ReadData or ISOReadBinary, if successful. On subsequent read commands targeting the same file, the SDMReadCtr is not increased, and the current value is used. As soon as a different command has been received, the counter is incremented again on a subsequent read command. Also when varying between ReadData and ISOReadBinary, the counter is incremented on each first instance of the read command type. The SDMReadCtr is not incremented when authenticated. If the SDMReadCtr reaches the SDMReadCtrLimit (see Section 6.3.8.2) or the value 0xFFFFFF (if SDMReadCtrLimit is not enabled) and a first read command arrives at the PICC, an error is being returned. Command chaining, see Section 6.2.3, does not additionally affect the counter increase. The chained command is considered as a single command. SDMReadCtr can be retrieved via the mirroring as part of the PICCData, see Section 6.3.8.3, or it can be retrieved via GetFileCounters. A30 All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © 2025 NXP B.V. All rights reserved. Product data sheet Rev. 3.0 — 27 January 2025 Document feedback 976730 32 / 209 |
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